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Abstract 
The study of the effect of political connections on the Tunisian firm performance after the 2011 uprising 
is the focal point of the paper. First, by applying a multiple linear regression model, the results show that 
political connections are positively associated with the market firm performance. Thereafter, a difference 
in difference model is applied to separate the connected and non-connected firms. Such a method is 
most likely to determine the factors driving the market performance of politically connected firms. Hence, 
results reveal that leverage, age and equity holdings increase the market performance of politically 
connected firms.   
Keyword: Firm performance, political connections, Tunisia 
Introduction1.
Political connections are set up by the links between politicians and the business elites (Faccio 
2006 and 2010). Actually, political connections bring about informal relationships favoring the 
appropriation of several advantages. The obtained advantages include an easier recourse to bank 
debts, tax exemptions and a larger market share. Other advantages lie in the search for a larger 
market share which can be achieved by a real monopolistic position, the advantages in the 
acquisition of concessions or licenses, and the acquisition of more prominent government 
contracts. Faccio (2006), in this respective, confirms the acquisition of these benefits from a sample 
of firms belonging to 47 countries.  
Accordingly, it becomes reasonable to accept the fact that politically exposed firms can take 
advantage of their relationships either to maintain or improve their performance. As a result, a 
poorly performing and politically exposed firm can not easily justify its own position because political 
links, normally, should help to settle a certain number of problems. In this case, the reason for poor 
performance can only be due to the manager's lack of will or skill or to the additional costs required 
to maintain these relationships. Indeed, this impact has appealed the attention of several studies 
around the world. Among the ones who have found a positive effect we can cite (Faccio 2006 ; 
Goldman et al. 2009 ; Boubakri et al. 2012 ; Ang et al. 2013 ; Coulomb and Sangnier 2014 ; Ding et 
al. 2014 ; Ling et al. 2016 ; Rijkers et al. 2017). On the other hand, some others have found a 
negative effect such as Fisman 2001; Roberts 1990, Faccio and Parsley 2009, Faccio 2010; Saeed 
et al. 2015. The previous studies came up with mixed findings; therefore, it becomes increasingly 
important to scrutinize the benefits and costs of political connections so as to provide further 
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explanations. 
This article is aimed to study the impact of political connections on the performance of 
Tunisian firms. The particularity of this study lies in the choice of the context and the period of 
study. Indeed, the period of 2012-2015 is characterized by the proliferation of a democratic 
atmosphere which came after a quarter-century of dictatorship. It is then important to check the 
impact of political connections on performance in these conditions. As a matter of fact, the study 
focuses on a sample of 49 Tunisian firms listed in the Tunis stock exchange. Among the selected 
firms, we identify those that are politically connected according to the definition of faccio (2006). 
The obtained results reinforce the arguments in favor of a positive relationship between 
political connections and performance. Thus, the proliferation of a political atmosphere does not 
prevent the propensity of the firms which are politically connected to the acquisition of private 
profits. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review about the effect of 
political connections on the firm performance. Section 3 presents the sample and the variables 
studied. Section 4 focuses on the adopted methodology. Section 5 includes the results and 
discussion. The paper ends with a conclusion in section 6. 
 
 Literature Review 2.
 
2.1 The positive effect of political connections on the firm performance 
 
The resource-based theory predicts that politically connected firms can gain several advantages 
that allow them to realize competitive edges over their competitors (Barney 1991). This position 
improves performance as it has been proven by various studies. Goldman et al. (2009) are 
interested in the effect of political connections on the American firms listed in the stock-market. 
They come up with two main results. First, they point out that such links generate a value by 
anticipating the benefits that the politically connected person can raise in the future. Moreover, they 
show that these firms show a succession of abnormal returns after the appointment of a politically 
connected person in the board of directors. The authors state that these results are more strongly 
marked in large firms. The last result is consistent with Faccio (2006) who found that the value of a 
firm increases when there is a strong political connections. Similarly, after analyzing the price 
reaction of equities during the 2000 presidential election, Goldman et al. (2009) found that the 
American firms connected to the political party increase their value. Ang et al. (2013) show that 
political connections have a positive effect on the value of the firm by considering the case of 
Singapore. However, Ding et al. (2014) confirm this same positive effect by taking the case of 
China. 
 
2.2 The negative effect of political connections on the firm performance 
 
Indeed, political connections can have negative effects on the performance of the firm. This 
situation is made concrete when the objective of political connections is the appropriation of 
acquired private benefits in the form of rents at the expense of the performance of the firm. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993) study the behavior of politically connected firms and point out that political 
connections are one of the main reasons for the firms’ inefficiency. In addition, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) refer to the costs of the relationship between politicians and firms. In their analysis of the 
value obtained from political connections, they say that politicians themselves want to appropriate a 
part of this value in exchange for the connections that they provide; thus, the value of the firm will 
be improved only when the marginal benefits of political connections exceed their marginal costs. In 
this context, Fisman (2001) and Johnson and Mitton (2002) explain this fact through the politically 
exposed firms which focus on non-productive activities based on a rent situation that increases the 
burden and compensates for any other gain. De Soto (1989) argues that in Peru, bribes replace the 
taxes that must normally be paid by firms. Faccio and Parsley (2009) prove that the firms affected 
by political connections are decreasing their value after announcing the unexpected death of a 
politician. 
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 Research Design 3.
 
3.1 Data 
 
The sample comprises 49 Tunisian firms which are listed in the Stock Exchange of Tunis. The 
studied sectors are industry, food industry, trade, transport, tourism and communication. The 
banking, insurance, leasing and investment and the real estate sectors are excluded because of 
their different financial status. The study period spans over 4 years from 2012 to 2015. 
Among the firms in the sample, we identify those that are politically connected. To do this, we 
refer to the definition proposed by Faccio (2006). According to the author, a firm is considered 
politically connected if one of the managers or shareholders is a member of parliament, a minister, 
or is closely related to a politician or a political party.  
In fact, any firm that has, at the level of its ownership structure or board of directors, a 
minister, a person belonging to a political party, a member or a deputy of parliament or any person 
with political connections is considered to be politically connected.  
 
3.2 Variable definitions 
 
3.2.1 Firm performance  
 
The firm performance is measured by the Tobin’s Q. The market measure of the firm received a 
broad support in the previous literature (Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988). The Tobin’s Q is 
constructed as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of the total debts divided 
by the book value of the total assets.  
 
3.2.2 Political connections 
 
Most of the studies dealing with politically connected firms measure political connections by a 
dummy variable (Faccio 2006, Saeed et al. 2015). Also, the variable political connections (PC) 
takes the value 1 if at least a majority shareholder or a top executive member is politically 
connected and 0 otherwise.  
 
Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of total debts divided by 
the book value of total assets. 
Political 
connections (PC) 
Dummy variable that equal 1 if at least one of the shareholders or managers is a 
member of parliament, a minister, or is closely linked to a politician or a political 
party. 
Leverage 
(LEVERAGE) 
The ratio of total debt to total assets 
Size (SIZE) The natural logarithm of the total assets. 
Equity (EQUITY) The ratio of equity to total assets. 
Age (AGE) The natural logarithm of the firm age 
 
3.3 Estimation Models 
 
The aim of this research is to determine the effect of political connections on the Tunisian firm 
performance. The models are estimated by the generalized least squares (GLS) to raise the matter 
of auto-correlation error and heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are clustered at the firm and 
years levels. First, we estimate the following panel regression model:  
Tobin's Qit = β0 + β1PCit + β2SIZEit + β3LEVERAGEit + β4EQUITYit + β5AGEit + δt + ui + εit 
Subsequently, a difference-in-difference model has been applied. The objective is to 
distinguish between two groups of firms. The group of interest is made up of the politically 
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connected firms. The control group is composed of the non-connected firms. This method allows 
determining the factors driving the market performance of politically connected firms. The 
estimation model is the following: 
Tobin's Qit = β0 + β2SIZEit*PCit + β3LEVERAGEit*PCit + β4EQUITYit*PCit + β5AGEit*PCit + δt + ui + εit 
Where, Tobin's Q is the ratio of the firm’s total market value to the total assets. PC is a dummy 
variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is politically connected. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of the total debt to equity. EQUITY is the ratio of the equity to 
the total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of age. δt is the time fixed effect. ui is the individual 
fixed effect. εit is an error term. 
 
 Summary Statistics 4.
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample. The average Tobin’s Q is 1.413. 
This result shows that the firm-market value exceeds the book value and confirms the ability of the 
market value to identify the differences in systematic risks, temporary disequilibrium effects and 
potential future growth (Saeed et al. 2015). Similarly, they put emphasis on the limits of the 
accounting method. Furthermore, almost 27% of the firms are politically connected. The politically 
connected people are members of parliament, ministers, or persons who are closely related to a 
politician or a political party. The political connections are determined either through a participation 
in the ownership structure or through a membership in the board of directors.   
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
Variables N Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Tobin’s Q 147 1.413 0.972 0.068 1.875 
SIZE 147 4.317 0.526 3.224 5.656 
LEVERAGE 147 0.223 0.205 0 0.937 
EQUITY 147 0.430 0.389 0 0.9484 
AGE 147 3.407 0.632 1.386 4.489 
Summary statistics for binary variable 
Variable Value Frequency 
PC 0 0.735 1 0. 265 
 
The descriptive analysis is carried out through a comparison between two sub-samples made up of 
connected and non-connected firms. The results are presented in table 3. The politically connected 
firms tend to outperform their peers. This performance is explained by a higher leverage, a larger 
size and seniority. However, these findings are statistically insignificant. 
   
Table 3: Comparison between connected and non-connected firms 
 
VARIABLE Non-connected firms Connectedted firms Difference t-value (A) (B) (A-B) 
Tobin’s Q 1.265 1.561 -0.296 -1.001 
LEVERAGE 54.941 62.211 -7.27 -0.996 
SIZE 18.260 18.474 -0.213 -0.904 
EQUITY 44.918 37.788 7.130 0.984 
AGE 3.342 3.588 -0.245 -2.245 
 
The Pearson correlation matrix presented above indicates the absence of any correlation problem 
between the explanatory variables.  
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Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 
 PC SIZE LEVERAGE EQUITY AGE 
PC 1     
SIZE 0.0749 1    
LEVERAGE -0.1316 0.1345 1   
EQUITY -0.0811 -0.1757* -0.2653* 1  
AGE 0.1722* -0.0021 -0.0469 -0.0356 1 
* The coefficients are significant at an error threshold of 10% 
 
 Results and Discussions 5.
 
5.1 The effect of political connections on the firm performance 
 
The regression results shown in Table (5) highlight the effect of political connections on 
performance. The coefficients associated with the political connections variable are positive and 
statistically significant. The positive association between performance and political connections has 
been proved by Ang et al. 2013; Goldman et al. 2009; Coulomb and Sangnier 2014; Ding et al. 
2014 and Li et al. 2008. Similarly, these results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
According to the resource-based theory, political connections offer advantages allowing firms to 
perform better than their competitors. Also, the politically connected firms increase their 
performance through their market value which can be explained by the optimistic and confident 
perception of the investors vis-à-vis these firms. 
 
Table 5: The effect of political connections on the firm performance 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) GLS Clustred Clustred 
PC 
 
0.210* 0.255* 0.0676 
(0.177) (0.179) (0.0878) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.123** 0.117* 0.0733*** 
(0.0623) (0.0625) (0.0199) 
SIZE 
 
-0.00892 -0.00544 -1.145*** 
(0.0625) (0.0622) (0.184) 
EQUITY 
 
0.129** 0.123** 0.0700*** 
(0.0625) (0.0626) (0.0202) 
AGE 
 
-0.00325 0.00132 0.00964 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.258) 
Constant -1.073* -1.011 1.545*** (6.180) (6.197) (3.732) 
Firm FE   YES 
Year FE  YES  
***, **,*: The coefficients are respectively significant at an error threshold of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
PC is a dummy variable that equal 1 if the firm is politically connected and 0 otherwise., LEVERAGE is 
the ratio of the total debt to total assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, EQUITY is the ratio 
of equity to total assets, AGE is the natural logarithm of the firm age. 
 
5.2 The factors driving politically connected firm performance 
 
In order to study the determining factors of the performance of politically connected firms, we 
distinguish the connected and non-connected firms. The results are presented in Table (6). 
Leverage has a positive and significant relationship with performance. The use of debt is one of the 
factors that can improve the performance of these firms. Then, size is negatively and significantly 
associated with performance. The size of the firm does not seem to be of great importance in the 
performance of politically connected firms. In contrast, age is positively and significantly related to 
performance. This means that the oldest firms with political connections are among the most 
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successful ones. The equity ratio is positively and significantly associated with the firm 
performance. Thus, equity holdings address the agency problem and enhance the firm market 
performance. 
 
Table 6: The determinants of the politically connected firm performance 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) GLS Clustred Clustred 
Connected firms 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.149** 0.143** 0.0429* 
(0.0645) (0.0644) (0.0239) 
SIZE 
 
-0.106 -0.0920 -0.999*** 
(0.130) (0.130) (0.193) 
EQUITY 
 
0.148** 0.142** 0.0386 
(0.0645) (0.0644) (0.0244) 
AGE 0.427* 0.417* 0.0412 (0.230) (0.228) (0.309) 
Unconnected firms 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.132** 0.127** 0.0733*** 
(0.0596) (0.0597) (0.0196) 
SIZE 
 
0.0506 0.0525 -1.147*** 
(0.0679) (0.0675) (0.181) 
EQUITY 
 
0.144** 0.139** 0.0701*** 
(0.0599) (0.0599) (0.0199) 
AGE 
 
-0.117 -0.106 -0.0658 
(0.137) (0.137) (0.261) 
Constant -1.261** -1.203** 1.589*** (5.921) (5.930) (3.676) 
Firm FE   YES 
Year FE  YES  
***, **,*: The coefficients are respectively significant at an error threshold of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
PC is a dummy variable that equal 1 if the firm is politically connected and 0 otherwise., LEVERAGE 
is the ratio of the total debt to total assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, EQUITY is 
the ratio of equity to total assets, AGE is the natural logarithm of the firm age. 
 
 Conclusion 6.
 
Political connections are then an asset as far these firms benefit from many advantages. Thus, 
there is a consensus in the earlier literature regarding the preferential access to debt, tax 
exemptions and the acquisition of a larger market share. However, the effect of political 
connections on performance is not so certain because it is difficult to arbitrate between the costs 
and the benefits of political connections. This article is in line with this research to check the effect 
of political connections on the performance of Tunisian firms. The period of study began after the 
revolution which allowed us to test this effect in a democratic political environment. The obtained 
results show that political connections are an asset for performance. This confirms that the political 
links provide access to privileges regardless of the political atmosphere. As it is a market measure, 
it is also possible to confirm that investors place their trust in these firms. Similarly, our results allow 
us to conclude that the determinants of the performance of politically connected firms are mainly 
debt, seniority and equity holdings.   
Since the revolution, Tunisia has not stopped improving its democratic course and its fight 
against corruption in its different forms. The topic of politically connected firms remains current to 
check the impact of the various reforms on the performance of these firms. 
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